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On Animal Rights 
from the GSU Philosophy Club 
Peter Singer, a contemporary 
ethicist and author of Animal 
Liberation, considers the following 
case. Suppose an infant is born with 
irreversible brain damage. The child 
will always remain a "human 
vegetable," unable to communicate, to 
recognize its surroundings or other 
people, to act independently, or to 
develop any kind of a self or a concept 
of itself. The parents realize that the 
situation is hopeless and, instead of 
attempting to sustain the infant’s life 
through costly medical procedures, 
request that doctors painlessly 
terminate the infant. Legally, of course, 
doctors are unable to do so, and 
furthermore many (most?) people 
would be horrified at the prospect of 
intentionally killing the infant.  
But, as Singer points out, at 
the same time these very same 
individuals do not object to killing 
animals. The question Singer poses is 
what is the ethical justification for 
these different judgments? Unlike the 
severely brain-damaged infant, adult 
chimpanzees, dogs, pigs, and members 
of other species can interact with their 
environments; they are self-aware; they 
can problem solve; they are intelligent; 
and they form empathetic bonds with 
others. Despite our best medical  
treatment, the brain-damaged infant 
will never reach the intelligence level 
of a dog. So is there a morally relevant 
distinction between killing a brain-
damaged human infant and killing 
animals? According to Singer, to 
suppose that it is morally wrong to kill 
the infant but morally permissible to 
kill animals because the infant is a 
member of the species homo sapiens, 
whereas chimpanzees, dogs, and pigs 
are not, is a blatant example of 




the morally objectionable view that 
species membership is morally relevant 
in our treatment of sentient beings.  
But, Singer explains, that the fact that I 
am a member of a given species (homo 
sapiens) is no more morally relevant 
than my race.  To treat creatures 
differently because they are not 
members of the species homo sapiens 
is as morally objectionable as treating 
humans differently because they are 
not members of a certain race.  
Speciesism is as bad as racism.  
Singer doesn’t think that 
someone who avoids speciesism has to 
admit that it is just as wrong to kill a 
pig as it is to kill a fully developed, 
well-functioning human being. There 
might be morally relevant 
differences between pigs and humans 
that allow us to kill pigs but not 
humans. If we are to avoid speciesism, 
however, we must recognize that all 
beings who are similar in morally 
relevant respects have an equal right to 
life. But we should not assume that this 
set of morally relevant properties will 
pick out all and only members of our 
species homo sapiens. If we recognize 
that there are some properties that 
make the lives of some beings (humans 
and nonhumans) more valuable than 
others, we may be forced to admit that 
the lives of some animals are more 
valuable than the lives of some 
humans.  For example, the life of a 
chimpanzee may be more valuable 
than the life of a severely retarded 
human infant or someone in the 
advances stages of Alzheimer’s. To 
develop a right to life on the basis of a 
set of morally relevant properties 
means that an animal may have a 
strong (if not stronger) claim to the 
right to life than some human beings.  
Finally, on this view, it may 
turn out to be the case that 
chimpanzees, dogs, and pigs have a 
right to life which we egregiously 
violate when we put them to sleep  
 
 
when they are old and suffering. Or, it 
may turn out to be the case that 
severely mentally retarded or senile 
human beings lack a strong right 
to life and can therefore be killed for 
the same reasons we now use when we 
kill animals. Two philosophical/ethical 
questions therefore emerge: first, what 
are the morally relevant properties 
(criteria) which grant a creature a right 
to life; and, secondly, how should we 
go about consistently applying these 
criteria in our ethical treatment of 
humans and animals alike? 
Please join the Philosophical 
Debate Group on Wednesday, 
November 14 as we discuss the issue of 
our ethical treatment of animals.  Dr. 
Weiss, professor of philosophy at 
Georgia Southern, will be leading the 
discussion.  We will meet in Gamble 
Hall in the Honor’s Lounge at 7:30.   
 
Summaries of Previous 
Meetings 
by Eric Verhine 
 In the joyous month of 
October the Philosophical Debate 
Group held two pleasant meetings.  Dr. 
Larry Lesser of the Mathematics 
Department led a meeting on October 
10.  The subject of his talk was the 
relationship of philosophy to 
mathematics, and of mathematics to 
philosophy.  Philosophy, since its 
western inception in Greece, has 
involved itself with mathematics.  
Numerous “big-name” philosophers 
were also mathematicians: Pythagoras, 
Plato, Leibniz, Spinoza, Whitehead, 
Frege, and Russell.   
 However, Dr. Lesser 
approached the subject topically, 
discussing and leading discussion over 
some of the following issues.  We 
debated, and of course came to no 
conclusion, about the nature of 
mathematics, whether humans discover 
it or create it.  Some maintain that  
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mathematical laws are conceptual 
translations of patterns found in the 
physical universe.  Others hold that 
mathematical laws are merely 
conceptual grids, frames, or 
perspectives which thinkers place over 
reality and which in fact make reality 
what it is.  Change the grid, as moderns 
changed from the Newtonian to the 
Einsteinian grid, and one gets not 
simply a different understanding of 
reality, but a whole new reality.  This 
problem of whether humans created or 
discovered mathematics is, obviously, 
a problem which mathematics itself 
cannot solve.  It is a philosophical 
problem, and one’s solution to the 
problem, in my opinion, depends  
primarily on the overall worldview one 
holds.   
 The group also discussed the 
objectivity or absoluteness of 
mathematical knowledge.  In the 
history of philosophy, thinkers have 
often given mathematical truth a 
special status as the unquestionably 
absolute and objective truth.  After all, 
two plus two must always equal four, 
right?  Well, that is true, but it is only 
true for one who accepts certain basic 
assumptions that constitute traditional 
western mathematics, assumptions that 
are not themselves demonstrable.  The 
Austrian mathematician Kurt Godel, in 
his famous “Incompleteness Theorem,” 
showed that the propositions on which 
any mathematical system is based are 
themselves unprovable, since it is 
possible to construct an axiomatic 
proposition which is neither provable 
nor unprovable within the system 
itself.   
 Dr. Lesser also explained to 
the group how modern theories of 
statistics still play out the debate 
between empiricists and rationalists.  
He raised many questions regarding 
values in mathematics and 
mathematical teaching.  We discussed 
the presumed objectivity of statistics, 
and noted how all presentations of 
statistics depend on the subjective 
choice, framing, and perspective of the 
statistician.  Dr. Lesser helped us to 
consider how one should teach 
mathematics, and pointed out that even 
the teaching of mathematics is not 
value free or neutral.   
 We had our second meeting 
of October in Statesboro.  This meeting 
involved the Philosophy Clubs of 
Georgia Southern and Savannah State, 
as well as the gallant Philosophical 
Debate Group.  At this meeting Dr. 
Nordenhaug gave a lecture entitled 
“Reflections on Aristotle, Bureaucracy, 
and Terrorism: Where Has All the 
Virtue Gone?”   Nordenhaug focused 
primarily on the distinction between 
Aristotle’s reasoning about ethics and 
modern reasoning.  Modern reasoning 
about ethics is, he said, 
methodological, concentrated on strict 
rules of morality and on actions and 
their consequences instead of persons.  
Aristotle’s approach to ethics, called in 
philosophy a “virtue ethic,” 
concentrates on developing personal 
character and with that a form of moral 
wisdom that allows one to react well to 
new situations.  Bureaucrats usually 
apply methodological reasoning about 
ethics to the masses.  When a problem 
arises, the bureaucrat thinks that she 
can solve it by the application of 
general rule addressing the problem.  
This form of solution, however, only 
separates people from their actions, 
and it fragments their ethical lives from 
their actual existences.  When people 
no longer feel any connection to their 
“virtues,” but see morality as the 
mundane and mindless process of 
following rules established by 
authorities, they cease to be, according 
to Aristotle, real human beings.  
Moreover, the separation of self from 
virtue and action causes psychological 
turmoil, which may result in acts of 
terrorism, such as those done by the 
Unabomber.  Thus, as Nordenhaug 
noted, the bureaucrat and the terrorist 
presuppose and fashion one another.            
  
A Glimpse of the 
Philosophical Future  
by Eric Verhine     
The approaching Spring 
semester promises much for an eager, 
fall weary Philosophical Debate 
Group.  I have prepared several topics 
for the PDG to debate and discuss.  
One topic is based on a book I read 
written by Mark Seltzer called Wound 
Culture.  We will discuss why torn or 
bloodied bodies and psyches so 
enamor the American public, why 
serial killers breathe so well in 
American air, why so many people 
tune into ER, and numerous other 
American oddities.  Another topic we 
will discuss is that of meaning.  Does 
life have any meaning at all?  What is 
meaning?  How can we justify our 
claims either that life has meaning or 
that it has no meaning?  A third topic is 
that of education.  We will debate what 
the nature and aims of (college) 
education should be, and what practical 
course of studies or curriculum would 
serve students best.  Other possible 
topics include sexual ethics, social 
determinism, the future of capitalism, 
and certain feminist issues (or 
whatever else my rootless mind settles 
on).  
However, all the 
aforementioned topics are only 
provisional.  I would much prefer that 
other students propose topics for 
discussion, write the requisite article 
for The Philosopher’s Stone, and then 
lead the group discussion.  If you have 
a topic you would like to propose for 
discussion, please contact me or Dr. 
Nordenhaug.  I would gladly, with 
limitless and unwavering jollity, set 
aside one of my topics for another 
student’s topic.   
 In addition to PDG meetings 
proper we have joint meetings with 
Georgia Southern and Savannah State 
to look forward to.  I plan to work to 
keep up this union (a president’s 
promise).  I have already asked Jack 
Simmons from Savannah State to lead 
one meeting next semester; then it will 
be turn again for an Armstrong 
professor (probably the jocose Dr. Joe 
Weaver) to lead a meeting.  Whatever 
comes to be, keep up a keen and 
systematic watch for each issue of The 











If you have any comments, 
criticisms, or contributions for The 
Philosopher’s Stone, please send 
them to either Eric Verhine or Dr. 
Nordenhaug.  
 
Eric Verhine (Editor) 
everhine@yahoo.com 
Dr. Erik Nordenhaug (Faculty 
Advisor) 
nordener@mail.armstrong.edu 
